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The Impact of Federal Preemption of State Antipredatory Lending Laws on the Foreclosure Crisis
Author(s) -
Ding Lei,
Quercia Roberto G.,
Reid Carolina K.,
White Alan M.
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.1002/pam.21604
Subject(s) - preemption , business , federal preemption , limiting , federal law , foreclosure , home equity , state (computer science) , default , financial system , economics , finance , incentive , market economy , state law , mechanical engineering , algorithm , computer science , welfare , engineering , operating system
State antipredatory lending laws ( APL s) are designed to protect borrowers against predatory lending that can increase the risk of default and deplete the home equity held by borrowers. Federal regulators instituted preemption that limited the scope and reach of state antipredatory lending regulations for certain lenders. Based on the variation in state laws and the variation in the regulatory environment among lenders, this paper identifies the effects of federal preemption of state APL s on the quality of mortgages originated by preempted lenders. The results provide evidence of a relatively higher increase in default risk among loans exempted from strong state antipredatory laws. These results are most robust among refinance mortgages with adjustable interest rates—a large and highly dynamic market in the period of analysis. The findings provide initial evidence that preemption of state mortgage lending regulations may result in an increase in mortgage default risk, thus limiting consumer protection in the residential mortgage market.