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Should you turn yourself in? The consequences of environmental self‐policing
Author(s) -
Stafford Sarah L.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.1002/pam.20249
Subject(s) - enforcement , audit , business , agency (philosophy) , compliance (psychology) , law enforcement , order (exchange) , hazardous waste , accounting , finance , political science , engineering , law , psychology , philosophy , epistemology , social psychology , waste management
Facilities that self‐police under the Environmental Protection Agency's Audit Policy are eligible for reduced penalties on disclosed violations. This paper investigates whether self‐policing has additional consequences; in particular, whether self‐policing reduces future enforcement activity. Using data on U.S. hazardous waste enforcement and disclosures, I find that facilities that self‐police are rewarded with a lower probability of inspection in the future, although facilities with good compliance records receive a smaller benefit than facilities with poor records. Additionally, facilities that are inspected frequently are more likely to disclose than facilities that face a low probability of inspection. The results suggest that facilities may be able to strategically disclose in order to decrease future enforcement. © 2007 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management