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Responsive bureaus, equity, and regulatory negotiation: an empirical view
Author(s) -
Langbein Laura I.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.1002/pam.10054
Subject(s) - rulemaking , delegate , negotiation , enforcement , law and economics , agency (philosophy) , bureaucracy , equity (law) , administrative law , business , political science , public relations , public administration , public economics , economics , law , sociology , computer science , social science , politics , programming language
Rulemaking agencies commonly delegate the implementation and enforcement of rules to affected parties, butthey rarely delegate rulemaking authority. Regulatory negotiation is an example of this uncommon behavior.Compared to conventional rulemaking, regulatory negotiation is thought to be an attempt to make bureaucracymore responsive to affected stakeholders, especially when the rulemaking concerns politically complicated andtechnical issues. However, negotiation, while it may make bureaucrats more responsive, may also be less fair inthat it is likely to result in relatively more responsiveness to interests supported by those with greaterresources. This study presents empirical evidence that compares negotiated to conventional rulemaking processesat the Environmental Protection Agency in respect to both responsiveness and equality. The results uphold theexpectation that negotiating rules appears more responsive than the conventional rule‐writing process.Furthermore, the results show inequality in both processes; outcomes of negotiated rules may be moreunequal than outcomes of conventionally written rules. © 2002 by the Association for Public PolicyAnalysis and Management.