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Agency governance and enforcement: the influence of mission on environmental decisionmaking
Author(s) -
Firestone Jeremy
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.1002/pam.10052
Subject(s) - sanctions , enforcement , agency (philosophy) , business , harm , corporate governance , law enforcement , environmental crime , politics , public administration , public economics , law , economics , political science , finance , philosophy , epistemology
Administrative agencies seeking to impose sanctions for regulatory violations can handle matters internally orthrough civil or criminal courts. Organizational culture, legal constraints, and political and private actors mayinfluence governance and hence choice of enforcement venue. An enforcement behavior model is constructed and testedempirically using a 1990–1997 sample of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air, water, andhazardous waste penalty cases involving individuals. While EPA's enforcement arm embraces the mission of itsregulatory arm—minimizing environmental harm—in part, it also has attributes of a police andprosecution force—specifically deterring (and maximizing social welfare) or incapacitatingindividual violators. Nevertheless, EPA may fail to minimize violations of and generally deter non‐culpableindividuals who are affiliated with large firms. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis andManagement.