Premium
Models of judicial administration and the independence of the judiciary: a comparison of Romanian self‐management and the Czech executive model
Author(s) -
Smith B. C.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
public administration and development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.574
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 1099-162X
pISSN - 0271-2075
DOI - 10.1002/pad.483
Subject(s) - judicial independence , rule of law , legislature , czech , democracy , politics , political science , authoritarianism , law , judicial activism , independence (probability theory) , democratic consolidation , judicial review , judicial reform , consolidation (business) , separation of powers , law and economics , public administration , sociology , economics , democratization , accounting , philosophy , linguistics , statistics , mathematics
The Rule of Law is a necessary condition for economic, social and political development in countries undergoing transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The Rule of Law requires an independent judiciary, one that is impartial and insular. In Eastern Europe democratic transition has produced two models of judicial administration: judicial self‐management and the executive model. Romania is a case of the former, the Czech Republic an instance of the latter. Comparison of the two cases suggests that while political developments are important to the preservation of judicial independence, the consolidation of democracy and the organisation of the judiciary are in a reciprocal relationship. The organisation of the judiciary is necessary for the legislative transparency and oversight of the executive branch which in turn guards against the politicisation of judicial management, with its adverse consequences for the independence of the judiciary and ultimately the Rule of Law. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.