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Eyes wide shut? Reforming and defusing checks and balances in Argentina
Author(s) -
Santiso Carlos
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
public administration and development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.574
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 1099-162X
pISSN - 0271-2075
DOI - 10.1002/pad.468
Subject(s) - incentive , language change , corporate governance , context (archaeology) , politics , government (linguistics) , economics , emerging markets , audit , developing country , economic policy , political economy , business , political science , market economy , finance , accounting , economic growth , law , art , paleontology , linguistics , philosophy , literature , biology
Abstract How effective are autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) in curbing corruption and improving fiscal governance in emerging economies? AAAs are autonomous oversight agencies tasked with scrutinising government finances. However, they are not as effective as they could or should be, partly because of the political constraints they face and the political economy context in which they are embedded. This article assesses the performance and trajectory of the Argentine AAA. It suggests that AAAs can have only a limited impact when formal fiscal institutions are undermined by informal practices and undercut by adverse political incentives. It further highlights the limits of radical reform strategies based on the import of exogenous institutional models. This research has important research and policy implications for the reform and strengthening of AAAs in developing countries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.