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Taxation and local government accountability in a clientelist context: Colombia
Author(s) -
Merat Jacques
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
public administration and development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.574
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 1099-162X
pISSN - 0271-2075
DOI - 10.1002/pad.285
Subject(s) - accountability , decentralization , politics , revenue , local government , clientelism , context (archaeology) , economics , property tax , agency (philosophy) , public administration , government (linguistics) , business , public economics , economic policy , finance , market economy , democracy , political science , law , sociology , paleontology , social science , philosophy , biology , linguistics
Increasing the accountability of local government is an important objective of decentralisation. One way to achieve greater accountability is to enhance the reliance of local governments on locally raised taxes. Property taxes are a prime source of increased revenue for local governments. However, it is difficult to levy them effectively in clientelist political systems, like that of Colombia. Recent reforms there have increased the capacity of municipal governments to raise revenue through property taxation. Giving responsibility for assessments of property values to an independent national agency has been especially useful. Municipal government finances are now to some degree independent and protected from the influence of clientelistic political parties. However continuing problems include: the reluctance of mayors to enforce taxation liabilities; the obstacles to opening local political debates on taxation; and the problems faced by national governments in trying to monitor municipal revenues and expenditures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.