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The evolution of taxi policy in Ireland
Author(s) -
Weir Stephen
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
journal of public affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.221
H-Index - 20
eISSN - 1479-1854
pISSN - 1472-3891
DOI - 10.1002/pa.395
Subject(s) - credibility , compromise , incentive , order (exchange) , economics , power (physics) , point (geometry) , public policy , simplicity , public economics , public administration , political science , law , market economy , economic growth , finance , philosophy , physics , geometry , mathematics , epistemology , quantum mechanics
This paper analyzes the role of interest groups in the setting of taxi policy in Ireland during the 1990s. It uses a simple illustrative game theoretic framework to explain the behavior of the taxi lobby and politicians in determining taxi policy over the decade. It draws on recent theoretical advances that explain the impact of negative incentives (i.e., strikes, blockades, smear campaigns, physical threats, etc.) on the relationship between lobby groups and policymakers and their effect on policy reform. This paper shows that the taxi lobby exerted significant power over policy determination during the decade and that they used both their connections with politicians and strikes and blockades in order to obtain favorable policy outcomes. It further demonstrates that as the decade progressed, the problems of the policy became more obvious to the public and became increasingly costly for politicians in terms of support and credibility. This visibility and the simplicity of the policy solution weakened the taxi lobby's ability to confuse the issue and maintain their favorable policy. It also shows that the taxi lobby's inability to compromise to ameliorate the public's concerns eventually led to the ‘worst possible’ policy outcome from their point of view. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.