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The game of manifestos!
Author(s) -
Pandey Ashish
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
journal of public affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.221
H-Index - 20
eISSN - 1479-1854
pISSN - 1472-3891
DOI - 10.1002/pa.1917
Subject(s) - manifesto , lying , politics , simple (philosophy) , law and economics , economics , microeconomics , political science , business , social psychology , computer science , public relations , psychology , law , epistemology , philosophy , medicine , radiology
This paper investigates, leveraging a simple two‐stage game with incomplete information, the motivation behind announcing unreasonable commitments in the manifesto by candidates and political parties. I analyse the expected communication pattern in an environment where legal costs are not imposed for broken promises and psychological costs related to lying are not incurred by candidates. I demonstrate that there is an absence of separation between a high‐type candidate and a low‐type candidate regarding the degree to which they indulge in “cheap talk.” This paper also analyses the introduction of a penalty for broken promises and establishes that an imposition of penalty has the potential to improve the behaviour of political parties by inducing separation.