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Intervention unnecessary: bar associations taking sides in regulatory actions
Author(s) -
Krell Matthew Reid
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
journal of public affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.221
H-Index - 20
eISSN - 1479-1854
pISSN - 1472-3891
DOI - 10.1002/pa.1622
Subject(s) - rulemaking , notice , dissent , supreme court , legislature , political science , agency (philosophy) , dissenting opinion , law , interest group , politics , intervention (counseling) , variety (cybernetics) , law and economics , public relations , sociology , psychology , social science , artificial intelligence , psychiatry , computer science
Interest groups participate in the political process in a variety of ways. They can lobby the legislature, interact with elected and administrative executive officials, and participate in litigation either as a litigant or an amicus curiae. But the literature is scarce in exploring how interest groups behave when their stakeholders dissent. This study explores the actions by one interest group, the American Bar Association (ABA), in participating in “notice and comment” rulemaking by the Department of Labor where the ABA did not represent the legal profession. It finds that the ABA engaged in astroturfing, and that their efforts were ignored by the Department. This suggests that astroturfing may not be useful in the notice and comment rulemaking process, because the agency's unitary status allows them to discern the centralized origin of the comments. This finding is confirmed by comparing the ABA's influence on the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush , when it did represent the consensus of the legal profession.