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Diluted regulations—a need to review the theoretical classification of the different lobbying regulatory environments
Author(s) -
Veksler Albert
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
journal of public affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.221
H-Index - 20
eISSN - 1479-1854
pISSN - 1472-3891
DOI - 10.1002/pa.1495
Subject(s) - politics , legislature , public interest , law and economics , democracy , public economics , economics , interest group , order (exchange) , public policy , business , public administration , law , political science , finance
Regulation has been claimed to be acquired by the industry, yet while the economic regulation was often established with the approval and encouragement of the regulated industry, social regulation has usually been thrust upon industry following demands by public interest groups. Why would the social regulation still fail to produce behaviour, or results in accordance with the public interest, if the public interest groups initiated it? The failure to define clearly the concept of ‘public interest’ and the absence of adequately clear regulatory objectives would not provide all the convincing answers. The wish of the politicians to respond to a mischief before public concern dies down, seems to point towards the symbolic politics claims. Although lobbying is integral to democratic politics, it challenges the policy making process as the risks and opportunities associated with policy change are large. Lobbying regulations, belonging to the social regulations fold, have been observed as symbolic in Israel and are diluted by tricky loopholes. Recent research has used data from Centre of Public Integrity (CPI) in order to theoretically classify different regulatory environments. The CPI measures only what the law says, but it does not measure the outcome—the application of the law. This paper points out that the possible interaction of symbolic politics with social regulation may lead to the reoccurring legislative void, resulting in the dilution effect of the lobbying regulations, and it highlights the need to review the theoretical classification, and thereby, also the actual strength of the different regulatory environments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.