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A differential environmental game with coupling constraints
Author(s) -
Tidball Mabel,
Zaccour Georges
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
optimal control applications and methods
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.458
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 1099-1514
pISSN - 0143-2087
DOI - 10.1002/oca.849
Subject(s) - constraint (computer aided design) , context (archaeology) , mathematical economics , differential game , mathematical optimization , coupling (piping) , differential (mechanical device) , computer science , face (sociological concept) , terminal (telecommunication) , horizon , economics , mathematics , engineering , telecommunications , mechanical engineering , paleontology , geometry , biology , aerospace engineering , social science , sociology
We consider a finite‐horizon two‐player differential game where the players face a common terminal environmental constraint. Our aim is to verify whether the result obtained in a static context, namely, that the Pareto‐optimal cooperative solution can be attained as a normalized noncooperative Rosen equilibrium, can be generalized to a dynamic setting. We show that this is not the case. However, we provide a taxation mechanism of players' emissions that forces them to implement the less‐polluting cooperative strategies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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