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An incentive‐compatible resource allocation problem allowing collusion
Author(s) -
Chiu Samuel S.,
Lin Qing
Publication year - 1987
Publication title -
optimal control applications and methods
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.458
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 1099-1514
pISSN - 0143-2087
DOI - 10.1002/oca.4660080308
Subject(s) - collusion , incentive , resource allocation , convergence (economics) , computer science , incentive compatibility , resource (disambiguation) , function (biology) , mathematical optimization , rate of convergence , microeconomics , operations research , economics , computer security , mathematics , computer network , macroeconomics , evolutionary biology , biology , key (lock)
This paper extends recent results on an incentive‐compatible modification of the Heal algorithm for resource allocation. Previous research has shown, under some assumptions, that the participants can be induced to report the truth in their own interest so as to achieve a group optimum. Using the same modified procedure, we show that if we allow secret collusion among users, participants can be induced to report quasi‐accurate information in their own interest so as to achieve a group optimum. The instantaneous convergence rate (in terms of a Lyapunov function) is faster when we allow collusion.