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Equilibria and threats in a fishery management game
Author(s) -
Hämäläinen R. P.,
Haurie A.,
Kaitala V.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
optimal control applications and methods
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.458
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 1099-1514
pISSN - 0143-2087
DOI - 10.1002/oca.4660060402
Subject(s) - realm , differential game , class (philosophy) , mathematical economics , stability (learning theory) , game theory , exponential stability , computer science , economics , mathematical optimization , mathematics , geography , artificial intelligence , physics , archaeology , nonlinear system , quantum mechanics , machine learning
A two‐country fishery management game is considered in the realm of the theory of non‐co‐operative and co‐operative differential games. Conditions which guarantee global asymptotic stability of the open‐loop equilibrium trajectories are given and applied to a class of harvest games. Co‐operative solutions of the two‐country fishery management games are examined for the case of Kalaï‐Smorodinsky bargaining schemes. We show that the use of retaliation threats can transform a co‐operative solution into an equilibrium memory strategy. Two numerical examples present an analysis of threat effectiveness. The ‘turnpike’ property, or global asymptotic stability of optimally controlled systems, is an important part of the computational approach used.