Open AccessGNSS interferometric reflectometry signature‐based defense
Author(s) -
Lewis Steven W.,
Chow C. Edward,
GeremiaNievinski Felipe,
Akos Dennis M.,
Lo Sherman
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
navigation
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.847
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 2161-4296
pISSN - 0028-1522
DOI - 10.1002/navi.393
Subject(s) - reflectometry , gnss applications , signature (topology) , interferometry , remote sensing , computer science , geology , global positioning system , physics , telecommunications , optics , mathematics , computer vision , time domain , geometry
Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to radio frequency interference (RFI) and spoofing. RFI detection has become trivial with many detection algorithms available and built into GNSS receivers; this is not the case with spoofing. GNSS spoofing can involve generating false GNSS signals with one or more altered components of GNSS satellite transmissions: radio frequency (RF) carrier, pseudorandom noise codes, and/or the broadcast navigation messages. We present GNSS interferometric reflectometry (GNSS‐IR) signature‐based defense: a new methodology to defend wireless space‐based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) transmissions against spoofing by leveraging existing, fixed GNSS receivers used in GNSS‐dependent critical infrastructure and key resource sectors. GNSS‐IR signature‐enabled defense provides spoofing and RFI detection without any changes to existing architecture by conducting input validation of GNSS receiver observables against the generated GNSS‐IR truth calibration signatures. This paper includes an overview of the theory, methodology, and results of live‐sky signature variability experiments.