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Allocation with demand competition: Uniform, proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms
Author(s) -
Li Jianbin,
Yu Niu,
Liu Zhixin,
Cai Xueyuan
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
naval research logistics (nrl)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.665
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1520-6750
pISSN - 0894-069X
DOI - 10.1002/nav.21734
Subject(s) - lexicographical order , monopolistic competition , microeconomics , profit (economics) , supply chain , business , nash equilibrium , order (exchange) , competition (biology) , industrial organization , economics , monopoly , marketing , mathematics , finance , combinatorics , ecology , biology
We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017

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