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A strategic model for state compliance verification
Author(s) -
Listner Clemens,
Niemeyer Irmgard,
Canty Morton,
Stein Gotthard
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
naval research logistics (nrl)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.665
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1520-6750
pISSN - 0894-069X
DOI - 10.1002/nav.21689
Subject(s) - disarmament , treaty , arms control , compliance (psychology) , state (computer science) , game theory , nash equilibrium , operations research , computer security , computer science , nuclear weapon , law , engineering , mathematical economics , economics , political science , psychology , social psychology , algorithm
Abstract The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016