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Specification vagueness and supply quality risk
Author(s) -
Wang Yimin
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
naval research logistics (nrl)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.665
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1520-6750
pISSN - 0894-069X
DOI - 10.1002/nav.21530
Subject(s) - vagueness , quality (philosophy) , product (mathematics) , order (exchange) , incentive , production (economics) , computer science , set (abstract data type) , business , risk analysis (engineering) , operations management , microeconomics , economics , mathematics , fuzzy logic , philosophy , geometry , epistemology , finance , artificial intelligence , programming language
Specifying quality requirement is integral to any sourcing relationship, but vague and ambiguous specifications can often be observed in practice, especially when a buyer is in the initial stage of sourcing a new product. In this research, we study a supplier's production incentives under vague or exact quality specifications. We prove that a vague specification may in fact motivate the supplier to increase its quantity provision, resulting in a higher delivery quality. Vague quality specification can therefore be advantageous for a buyer to screen potential suppliers with an initial test order, and then rely on the received quality level to set more concrete quality guidelines. There is a degree, though, to which vague quality specification can be effective, as too much vagueness may decrease the supplier's quantity provision and hence the expected delivery quality. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013