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Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds
Author(s) -
Deutsch Yael,
Golany Boaz,
Goldberg Noam,
Rothblum Uriel G.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
naval research logistics (nrl)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.665
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1520-6750
pISSN - 0894-069X
DOI - 10.1002/nav.21524
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , computer science , resource (disambiguation) , mathematical economics , resource allocation , operations research , function (biology) , sensitivity (control systems) , game theory , mathematical optimization , best response , mathematics , engineering , computer network , evolutionary biology , electronic engineering , biology
This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013