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Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies
Author(s) -
Arce Daniel G.,
Kovenock Dan,
Roberson Brian
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
naval research logistics (nrl)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.665
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1520-6750
pISSN - 0894-069X
DOI - 10.1002/nav.21500
Subject(s) - terrorism , computer security , context (archaeology) , computer science , government (linguistics) , business , political science , law , geography , linguistics , philosophy , archaeology
Abstract In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012