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Lateral capacity exchange and its impact on capacity investment decisions
Author(s) -
Chakravarty Amiya K.,
Zhang Jun
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
naval research logistics (nrl)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.665
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1520-6750
pISSN - 0894-069X
DOI - 10.1002/nav.20235
Subject(s) - investment (military) , stackelberg competition , capacity utilization , microeconomics , business , capacity management , investment decisions , nash equilibrium , economics , industrial organization , computer science , production (economics) , computer network , politics , political science , law
We study the problem of capacity exchange between two firms in anticipation of the mismatch between demand and capacity, and its impact on firm's capacity investment decisions. For given capacity investment levels of the two firms, we demonstrate how capacity price may be determined and how much capacity should be exchanged when either manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader in the capacity exchange game. By benchmarking against the centralized system, we show that a side payment may be used to coordinate the capacity exchange decisions. We then study the firms' capacity investment decisions using a biform game framework in which capacity investment decisions are made individually and exchange decisions are made as in a centralized system. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium capacity investment levels and study the impact of firms' share of the capacity exchange surplus on their capacity investment levels.© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007