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Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective
Author(s) -
Garoupa Nuno
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.987
Subject(s) - sanctions , incentive , enforcement , perspective (graphical) , criminal liability , corporate crime , business , criminal law , law and economics , law enforcement , punishment (psychology) , law , economics , political science , market economy , psychology , social psychology , artificial intelligence , computer science
Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. Second, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.