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Firm‐specific wage growth and changes in the labor market for managers
Author(s) -
Chauvin Keith W.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.4090150104
Subject(s) - wage , labour economics , incentive , compensation (psychology) , economics , efficiency wage , current population survey , business , population , microeconomics , psychology , demography , sociology , psychoanalysis
This paper analyzes recent changes in the employment relationships between managers and firms. In both Becker's and Lazear's models of firm‐specific wage growth, compensation is deferred from early in an employee's tenure with a firm until later in the contract. The deferred compensation bonds the worker to the firm. Based on cross‐sectional data from Current Population Surveys, rates of firm‐specific wage growth are estimated for the managerial labor market. The findings show that the rate of wage growth that is firm‐specific for managers in manufacturing industries declined significantly during the early 1980s. It is estimated, for example, that a manager with 12 years of tenure in a manufacturing firm enjoyed, on average, a 25% wage premium in 1979 over an otherwise similar manager who was a new hire in a firm. By 1983 the firm‐specific wage premium for a manager with 12 years of tenure was only 5%. These changes represent a significant reduction in the strength of the employment bond between firms and managers, and a reduction in the incentive effects previously enjoyed by firms from the use of deferred‐compensation schemes. This change is consistent with the significant increases in the displacement rates of managers that occurred during the 1980s.