Premium
Workers' enterprises in price competition
Author(s) -
Sertel Murat R.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.4090140507
Subject(s) - microeconomics , bertrand competition , stackelberg competition , economics , competition (biology) , nash equilibrium , equivalence (formal languages) , imperfect competition , general partnership , strategy , imperfect , industrial organization , oligopoly , cournot competition , game theory , mathematics , finance , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , discrete mathematics , biology
Extending earlier equivalence results for perfect competition and for (imperfect) quantity competition, here it is shown that in price competition, too, the behavior of a workers‘ enterprise (defined by the coincidence of its workers with its partners) is tamed by the worker‐partnership market so as to be identical with that of a twin entrepreneurial firm. Thus, not only is Bertrand–Nash equilibrium unaltered when an entrepreneurial firm is replaced by its workers’ enterprise twin, but such a replacement also leaves Bertrand‐von Stackelberg equilibrium intact whether we switch the leader or a follower from one form of ownership/management to the other.