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A non‐co‐operative bargaining model of membership expansion in a producer co‐operative
Author(s) -
Neary Hugh M.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.4090140504
Subject(s) - negotiation , microeconomics , economics , distribution (mathematics) , business , mathematics , law , political science , mathematical analysis
This paper presents a non‐co‐operative bargaining model of membership expansion in a producer co‐operative. The emphasis is on examining the distribution of the resulting surplus between the existing partners and the new member. In the presence of a number of alternative candidates, the existing partners can use the threat of switching negotiating partners to extract additional surplus from the negotiations. The degree of symmetry between the competing candidates necessary for these threats to be credible is specified, as is the nature of the dependence of the parties' payoffs on the various parameters of the model. Potential sources of misallocation within the model are identified.