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Equilibrium pricing and advertising strategies for nondurable experience products in a dynamic duopoly
Author(s) -
Chintagunta Pradeep K.,
Rao Vithala R.,
Vilcassim Naufel J.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.4090140303
Subject(s) - duopoly , dynamic pricing , consumption (sociology) , quality (philosophy) , competition (biology) , variety (cybernetics) , microeconomics , yield (engineering) , markov perfect equilibrium , advertising , market share , economics , nash equilibrium , business , marketing , computer science , cournot competition , ecology , social science , philosophy , materials science , epistemology , artificial intelligence , sociology , metallurgy , biology
The quality of many consumer nondurable goods or services is sufficiently complex or obscure that consumers cannot completely verify the true quality in a single usage. For such ‘experience’ products or services, the accumulated consumer consumption experience of a brand is an important determinant of its sales or market share. The market share of a brand is in turn directly influenced by its own and the competitive price and advertising strategies, given the different levels of quality (among other factors). In this paper, we investigate the impact of the aggregate consumption experience on the firm's dynamic pricing and advertising strategies by developing a formal game‐theoretic model of a dynamic duopoly. The model of competition does not yield explicit closed‐form expressions for the dynamic price and advertising paths of the two firms. Hence, we simulate the equilibrium paths using a discrete‐time algorithm. Our simulation results provide interesting insights into the dynamic equilibrium price and advertising paths, under a variety of realistic competitive scenarios.