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Abandoned mergers and the market for corporate control
Author(s) -
Taffler Richard J.,
Holl Peter
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.4090120402
Subject(s) - market for corporate control , business , control (management) , merger control , economics , monetary economics , finance , corporate governance , management , shareholder , commission
This paper investigates the financial performance cf a sample of UK firms involved in abandoned mergers during the period 1977–81. Predictions derived from a broadly neoclassical theory of merger activity are tested empirically and implications for the theory of the firm are discussed. Using an extension of discriminant analysis for firms in our samples we cannot find any evidence to suggest that the market for corporate control exercises discipline in completed mergers or in abandoned ones. In the latter case we suggest that the motives for takeovers tend to reflect managerial rather than shareholder interests.