Economists and the politician

One of Bill Hutt's lesser‐known books instinctively reflected the rapidly growing development of what was originally labelled ‘non‐market decision‐making’, now established as ‘public choice’, but better described as the economics of politics. His 1971 Politically Impossible ⃛ ? (IEA, London) confronted head‐on the frequent objections of politicians that economists' proposals could be both desirable and yet impossible to implement. ‘Politically impossible’ was the objection that had made economic proposals still‐born and inhibited economists from searching for truth. Politicians exhibit the occupational failing of wanting policies that are easy to sell to the electorate more than policies that are generally desirable. Hutt argued that proposals are resisted or rejected not because they are unacceptable by the public but because politicians fail in the power they claim to persuade the public of their advantages. Proposals for political reform are opposed by prospective losers but not supported by prospective winners. Economists interested in advising government therefore have to propose reforms that embrace a wide range of interest, so that the winners and losers cannot readily assess their gains and losses and organise to influence legislatures. But the best hope lies outside the political process in the market process by social advance that enable citizens as consumers to escape from vested interests to competitors in open markets and in technological change that weakens the ability of the interests to inhibit competition from new suppliers. Ultimately the political obstruction lies not with politicians, who must be expected to pursue personal interests, but with the political process that enables them to do so at the expense of the public interest. How far the remedy in different countries lies in constitutional reform to discipline politicians and in opening markets to weaken obstructive interests remains the question for economists and political scientists.