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Lead investors and information disclosure: A test of signaling theory by fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis approach
Author(s) -
Li Yaokuang,
Ling Li,
Zhang Daru,
Wu Juan
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.3276
Subject(s) - qualitative comparative analysis , syndicate , information asymmetry , equity (law) , equity crowdfunding , lead (geology) , business , fuzzy set , qualitative analysis , fuzzy logic , financial economics , economics , accounting , qualitative research , finance , computer science , political science , initial public offering , sociology , geomorphology , machine learning , artificial intelligence , law , geology , social science
This article aims to examine the complexity of lead investor's signaling by information disclosure in equity crowdfunding. We use 40 samples from a Chinese equity crowdfunding source to explore why lead investor influences followers' decision making and how lead investor signals effectively by using fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) approach. Our findings enrich the literature on the lead investors and syndicate by testing the complexity of signaling in equity crowdfunding, shed new light on investigating the decision‐making model of individuals at a disadvantage of information asymmetry, and offer insights into signaling strategically online.