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The dark side of competition: Modeling status games
Author(s) -
Arora Poonam,
Tedeschi Gwendolyn A.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.3032
Subject(s) - competitor analysis , competition (biology) , great rift , coordination game , test (biology) , microeconomics , pareto principle , work (physics) , economics , operations management , management , ecology , engineering , physics , astronomy , biology , mechanical engineering
Though “teams” are supposed to work together for the benefit of the firm, suboptimal outcomes may emerge when individuals within a team are more concerned with their own status and outcomes relative to their “teammates,” behaving as if they are competitors. Using a version of the stag hunt coordination game, we develop hypotheses regarding the role of status and competitiveness on coordination on Pareto optimal solutions. We test these hypotheses using three studies, with manipulations for both role and status. Status is found to play a significant role, resulting in suboptimal outcomes for competitors but not teammates.