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Effort reduction of employer‐to‐employer changers: Empirical evidence from football
Author(s) -
Weimar Daniel,
Scharfenkamp Katrin
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.3001
Subject(s) - football , proxy (statistics) , football players , investment (military) , business , empirical evidence , economics , labour economics , politics , law , political science , philosophy , epistemology , machine learning , computer science
We investigate changes in effort investment of employees who still fulfill a contract with their current employer but already signed a follow‐up contract with a new employer (employer‐to‐employer change). Because effort and outside contract assignments are hard to measure in firms, we use running data from professional football ( n = 26,577) to proxy effort decisions. Fixed effect regressions reveal a statistically significant but weak reduction in a player's effort after signing a follow‐up contract with a new club. Because we find a statistically significant effort reduction in public sports, this effect might be even larger in less transparent labor markets.