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Cybercrime and cloud computing. A game theoretic network model
Author(s) -
Bartholomae Florian
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.2904
Subject(s) - hacker , cybercrime , cloud computing , computer security , law enforcement , computer science , enforcement , profit (economics) , order (exchange) , cloud computing security , internet privacy , business , the internet , microeconomics , economics , law , world wide web , finance , political science , operating system
In this paper, a network model is developed in which three players—a profit‐maximizing provider of cloud computing services, its consumers, and a hacker—sequentially choose their strategies. Several scenarios with different levels of data security and public prosecution of the hacker are analyzed. Especially for the case when no security measurements are available, a firm's strategy to limit the network size in order to render hacking unattractive is discussed in detail. Finally, policy implications are given implying better international cooperation of the law enforcement authorities.