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Decentralized Supply Chain Decisions on Lead Time Quote and Pricing with a Risk‐averse Supplier
Author(s) -
Chen Weichun,
Li Bo,
Song Dongping,
Li Qinghua
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.2804
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , lead time , supply chain , microeconomics , risk aversion (psychology) , risk neutral , lead (geology) , economics , benchmark (surveying) , business , operations management , expected utility hypothesis , mathematical economics , marketing , geomorphology , geology , geodesy , geography
We consider a decentralized supply chain containing a risk‐averse supplier and a risk‐neutral retailer with lead time‐sensitive and price‐sensitive demands. A Stackelberg game is employed to model the lead time quote and pricing decision process between the two members under the conditional value‐at‐risk criterion. A unique equilibrium is obtained. Using the corresponding centralized mode as a benchmark, we find that a less risk‐averse supplier is better to cooperate and share risk with the retailer to improve the entire supply chain's efficiency. With a uniformly distributed realized lead time, the impact of the supplier's risk aversion on the decisions can be characterized by a few threshold values of the late delivery penalty cost. In particular, when the unit delay penalty cost exceeds a certain level, a more risk‐averse supplier will counter‐intuitively quote a shorter lead time by risking a higher delay penalty cost. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.