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No Seat at the Table: Representation in Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports
Author(s) -
Winfree Jason A.
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.2795
Subject(s) - monopsony , league , collective bargaining , incentive , bargaining power , compensation (psychology) , representation (politics) , economics , labour economics , professional sport , power (physics) , microeconomics , market power , sports economics , monopoly , political science , psychology , social psychology , politics , law , physics , astronomy , quantum mechanics
This study analyzes representation in collective bargaining in professional sports leagues and shows that the labor market is not completely competitive off‐the‐field. Because collective bargaining impacts future compensation and player unions are always represented by current players and often represented by more experienced players, there is a much higher incentive to advocate for policies that increase pay for more experienced players. Conversely, policies that maintain monopsony power for leagues with regards to inexperienced players, such as player drafts, have remained in sports leagues. However, these policies may also restrict the quantity demanded for more experienced players. This paper provides a theoretical model and examines empirical evidence regarding the differences between younger and older players. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.