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The Strategic Interplay Between Bundling and Merging in Complementary Markets
Author(s) -
Mantovani Andrea,
Vandekerckhove Jan
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.2685
Subject(s) - merge (version control) , bundle , industrial organization , microeconomics , business , economics , computer science , mathematical economics , information retrieval , materials science , composite material
In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the competitive pressure in the market, either the firms within both pairs merge, with or without bundling, or only one pair merges and bundles, whereas the other one remains independent. The latter case can be harmful for consumers as overall prices surge. We also consider the case where a pair moves before the other. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where the first movers merge, but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.