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Group Purchasing Organizations, Monopsony, and Antitrust Policy
Author(s) -
Blair Roger D.,
Durrance Christine Piette
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.2633
Subject(s) - monopsony , commission , negotiation , incentive , purchasing , business , standardization , economic justice , competition (biology) , economics , purchasing power , industrial organization , marketing , microeconomics , law , finance , political science , ecology , keynesian economics , biology
Group purchasing organizations (GPOs) consolidate the purchasing power of their members and negotiate contracts with input suppliers on their behalf. GPOs have received attention from the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission because of concerns over monopsony power and standardization of hospital production costs. GPOs have been criticized in the literature for their contracting practices, which may appear to be exclusionary, and their funding mechanism, which may lead to incentive incompatibility. We analyze these competitive concerns in turn. We find GPOs to be procompetitive and suggest an antitrust policy that preserves the benefits of GPO operations while protecting consumers from any competitive shortcomings. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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