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Influential ownership and capital structure
Author(s) -
Pöyry Salla,
Maury Benjamin
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.1477
Subject(s) - leverage (statistics) , capital structure , shareholder , debt , corporate governance , profitability index , business , financial system , state ownership , monetary economics , corporate finance , politics , finance , market economy , economics , emerging markets , machine learning , computer science , political science , law
This paper explores the relation between ownership structures and capital structures in Russia—an economy with a state‐run banking sector, weak corporate governance, and highly concentrated ownership. We find that firms with the state as controlling shareholder have significantly higher leverage than firms controlled by domestic private controlling shareholders other than oligarchs. Both firms controlled by the state or oligarchs finance their growth with more debt than other firms. Profitability is negatively related to leverage across all types of controlling owners, indicating a preference for internal funding over debt. The results indicate that firms with owners that have political influence or ties to large financial groups enjoy better access to debt. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.