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Allocation of decision rights in joint ventures
Author(s) -
Windsperger J.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.1464
Subject(s) - property rights , joint (building) , residual , test (biology) , business , microeconomics , property (philosophy) , industrial organization , economics , law and economics , computer science , architectural engineering , paleontology , algorithm , engineering , biology , philosophy , epistemology
Previous studies in organizational economics and international business research have not tested a property rights view on the allocation of decision rights (DR) in joint ventures (JVs). The paper offers a test of the property rights explanation by using data from Hungarian JVs. Our analysis derives the following hypothesis: The more important the JV partner's intangible knowledge assets for the generation of residual surplus, the more residual DR are assigned to him. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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