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Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation
Author(s) -
Cheng Suwina,
Firth Michael
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.1273
Subject(s) - executive compensation , corporate governance , profitability index , business , accounting , compensation (psychology) , stock (firearms) , finance , mechanical engineering , psychology , psychoanalysis , engineering
In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non‐executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.