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Corporate governance, ownership structure and corporate efficiency: the case of Ukraine
Author(s) -
Zheka Vitaliy
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.1258
Subject(s) - corporate governance , business , ukrainian , stock exchange , foreign ownership , accounting , state ownership , data envelopment analysis , quality (philosophy) , monetary economics , financial system , industrial organization , finance , economics , foreign direct investment , emerging markets , macroeconomics , mathematical optimization , linguistics , philosophy , mathematics , epistemology
The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of different ownership structures and of the quality of corporate governance on the Farrell measure of efficiency. Data Envelopment Analysis and Limited Dependent Variable Estimations are applied to the set of Ukrainian joint‐stock companies listed on the main Ukrainian stock exchange, First Securities Trading System. Domestic ownership of the organization is found to enhance efficiency the most, whereas managerial ownership has a detrimental effect on efficiency. Foreign owned firms are relatively inefficient; however foreign ownership is found to have a positive and significant effect on corporate governance quality. Concentrated ownership rights (including state ownership) improve efficiency, possibly reflecting country‐specific factors. The quality of corporate governance is found to have a positive impact on the efficiency of domestically owned firms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.