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Delegation of risky activities
Author(s) -
Watabe Akihiro
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.1227
Subject(s) - delegation , bankruptcy , moral hazard , principal (computer security) , adverse selection , remuneration , incentive , principal–agent problem , business , asset (computer security) , payment , accident (philosophy) , welfare , microeconomics , actuarial science , economics , finance , computer security , corporate governance , computer science , market economy , philosophy , management , epistemology
This paper studies the delegation contract of a risky activity under the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. The problem is posed as providing incentives from the principal to the agent to enhance the protective action of the agent through payment schemes. Given non‐bankruptcy of both the principal and the agent, the principal rewards the agent if no accident occurs but penalizes the agent if an accident occurs. Given bankruptcy of either the principal or the agent, regardless of the agent's risk type, the agent is only rewarded with the same amount of remuneration and not penalized if the accident occurs. The social welfare level resulting from contracting processes depends on the asset levels of both parties and the agent's technology to reduce risks of the activity. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.