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HOW DO GROUPS STABILIZE CORRUPTION?
Author(s) -
Schikora Jan Theodor
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
journal of international development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.533
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1099-1328
pISSN - 0954-1748
DOI - 10.1002/jid.2902
Subject(s) - language change , fractionalization , punishment (psychology) , economics , point (geometry) , microeconomics , social psychology , political science , psychology , law , mathematics , art , geometry , literature , ethnic group
This paper offers a theoretical explanation of the non‐linear relationship between the social structure measured by the fractionalization of a society and its level of corruption. By using a standard repeated multi‐stage‐game of corruption, considering punishment strategies and information transmission inside sub‐networks, we find the maximum level of corruption in highly fractionalized societies consisting of a large number of small groups. This is due to the effect of the relative size of sub‐networks on the trade‐off between the stabilizing effect of increasing the threat‐point towards the official and the destabilizing effect of demanding greater internalization of the negative external effect of corruption within network members. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.