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Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict
Author(s) -
Murshed Syed Mansoob,
Tadjoeddin Mohammad Zulfan
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
journal of international development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.533
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1099-1328
pISSN - 0954-1748
DOI - 10.1002/jid.1478
Subject(s) - grievance , elite , economic rent , context (archaeology) , economics , competition (biology) , social conflict , internal conflict , poverty , law and economics , political science , political economy , positive economics , law , market economy , politics , economic growth , biology , paleontology , ecology
Two phenomena have been recently utilised to explain conflict onset among rational choice analysts: greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation and the grievance it produces fuels conflict. Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict, something which requires institutional breakdown, which we describe as the failure of the social contract. The degradation of the social contract is more likely in the context of poverty and growth failure. We provide a synthesis of the greed and grievance hypotheses. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.