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The ethical implications of Paul Meehl's work on comparing clinical versus actuarial prediction methods
Author(s) -
Dawes Robyn M.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
journal of clinical psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.124
H-Index - 119
eISSN - 1097-4679
pISSN - 0021-9762
DOI - 10.1002/jclp.20180
Subject(s) - intuition , psychology , epistemology , preference , actuarial science , philosophy , economics , statistics , mathematics , cognitive science
Paul E. Meehl's work comparing statistical versus actuarial prediction—and the large body of research that followed by others on the same topic—was mainly theoretical and empirical. Meehl also suggested that this work led to a “practical” conclusion, which was quite strong. The author argues that, in addition, it leads to an ethical conclusion, equally strong. Whether the scientific findings are combined with an overarching ethical principle that the best predictions possible should be made for clients, or whether these findings are framed as delineating what can be done for clients—and that clinicians ought not to attempt to do what they cannot—the conclusion is the same. Whenever statistical prediction rules (SPR's) are available for making a relevant prediction, they should be used in preference to intuition. Any modification of these rules should be systematic and subject to the same type of evaluation originally used to assess the SPR's themselves. It is even possible to develop near‐optimal rules in new situations. Providing service that assumes that clinicians “can do better” simply based on self‐confidence or plausibility in the absence of evidence that they can actually do so is simply unethical. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Clin Psychol 61: 1245–1255, 2005.