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Strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data
Author(s) -
Kennan John,
Wilson Robert
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
journal of applied econometrics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.878
H-Index - 99
eISSN - 1099-1255
pISSN - 0883-7252
DOI - 10.1002/jae.3950040506
Subject(s) - settlement (finance) , econometrics , interpretation (philosophy) , conformity , attrition , economics , human settlement , wage , empirical modelling , wage bargaining , contrast (vision) , computer science , labour economics , engineering , political science , simulation , artificial intelligence , finance , law , medicine , dentistry , payment , programming language , waste management
Attrition, screening, and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence, mean duration, and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements. These predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in Canada and the United States. Conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features, and about the conformity of the models to the evidence. Methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models.