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Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR
Author(s) -
Sobel Russell S.,
Nesbit Todd M.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00827.x
Subject(s) - incentive , safer , stock (firearms) , business , economics , engineering , computer security , computer science , microeconomics , mechanical engineering
When safety regulation makes automobiles safer, drivers may drive more recklessly, partially or completely offsetting effects on the overall level of safety. Evidence of these offsetting effects has been hard to find, however, primarily because of the aggregate nature of accident data. In this paper we explore how changes in the safety of automobiles used in the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) has altered the incentive of drivers to drive recklessly. This unique data set allows more accurate and objective measurement of the necessary variables to test for these effects at a microlevel. Our results strongly support the presence of these offsetting behavioral effects.