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Does Crime Pay? A Classroom Demonstration of Monitoring and Enforcement
Author(s) -
Anderson Lisa R.,
Stafford Sarah L.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2006.tb00751.x
Subject(s) - enforcement , incentive , variety (cybernetics) , law enforcement , public economics , class (philosophy) , compliance (psychology) , economics education , economics , business , microeconomics , political science , psychology , social psychology , law , computer science , higher education , economic growth , artificial intelligence
This article presents a classroom game in which students choose whether or not to comply with pollution regulations. By varying the level of monitoring and fines for noncompliance, the game shows students how the probability and severity of enforcement affects incentives for compliance. The game can be adapted for settings other than environmental regulation and can be used in a variety of classes including regulation, law and economics, environmental economics, public economics, or economics of crime classes. It can easily be conducted in a 50‐minute class period.