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Subsidizing Charitable Giving with Rebates or Matching: Further Laboratory Evidence
Author(s) -
Eckel Catherine C.,
Grossman Philip J.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2006.tb00738.x
Subject(s) - subsidy , donation , matching (statistics) , endowment , subject (documents) , economics , artifact (error) , microeconomics , social psychology , psychology , public economics , marketing , actuarial science , business , computer science , law , political science , statistics , mathematics , world wide web , neuroscience , market economy , economic growth
We examine two different ways to subsidize charitable giving: by a rebate (returning a portion of the donation to the giver) or by a match (adding additional donations to the giver's donation). In previous experimental research, we have shown that participants give more to charity under the match than under an equivalent rebate. The previous within‐subject experimental design required participants to make a series of decisions under both types of subsidy. Each decision consisted of an allocation of an endowment between the subject and a charity chosen by the subject from a specified list. This article examines whether that result is an artifact of the previous within‐subjects design: subjects may have failed to fully distinguish the two types of subsidy. In the current article, we report results from a between‐subjects design, where participants are required to make only one type of decision—involving rebates or involving matching subsidies. Our results confirm previous findings.