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Polluters and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence
Author(s) -
Damania Richard,
Fredriksson Per G.,
Osang Thomas
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2005.tb00694.x
Subject(s) - collective action , perspective (graphical) , face (sociological concept) , manufacturing sector , action (physics) , industrial organization , empirical evidence , economics , business , manufacturing , microeconomics , public economics , marketing , labour economics , political science , sociology , politics , computer science , law , social science , philosophy , physics , epistemology , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence
We suggest a new perspective on firms' ability to organize collective action. We argue that industries that face a greater number of regulations have an easier time forming a lobby group and sustaining joint lobbying efforts. In particular, firms in industries that are pollution intensive , and therefore incur abatement costs, face an extra policy issue compared with other industries. The prediction that emerges from the theory is that more polluting industries should have greater levels of lobbying contributions. Using U.S. manufacturing sector data, we find empirical support for this hypothesis.