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Pollution Taxes When Firms Choose Technologies
Author(s) -
Amacher Gregory S.,
Malik Arun S.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2002.tb00464.x
Subject(s) - regulator , pollution , business , outcome (game theory) , industrial organization , microeconomics , economics , chemistry , ecology , biology , biochemistry , gene
We consider the properties of a pollution tax when the regulated firm has a discrete choice of technologies with which to reduce pollution. The firm's technology choice makes possible two sequences of play: the traditional one in which the regulator moves first, committing to a tax rate before the firm adopts a technology, and an alternative one in which the firm moves first by adopting a technology. We find that a range of pollution levels, including possibly the first‐best one, are unattainable when the regulator moves first. The regulator may be better able to achieve the first‐best outcome when the firm moves first.